policy reasons to separate spousal abuse from other kinds of conduct, 16 the jurisprudence has tended not to do this, 17 and the notion of a continuum of relevant behaviour, with domestic violence at one end, is inherent in the Kennon ruling.
The cases in this article were drawn from a larger sample of unreported judgments (n = 260) that was collected for a study of judicial and 'everyday' attitudes to property ownership and division of labour in intimate relationships. 18 The principal aim of the first stage of this project, which examined judicial decision making patterns, was to track the shifts (if any) in evaluating financial and non-financial contributions between 1976 and 2002. The sample of judgments, which represents 27 per cent of the relevant unreported property adjustment cases available in the Melbourne registry, 19 was selected to ensure a range of variables was represented, including both domestic and business asset cases and a spread of property values, relationship lengths, and judicial officers. As this suggests, investigation of marital fault was not part of the design for our project. However, in light of its re-emergence as a potential policy issue in modern family law debates, and given its appearance in a significant number of the judgments in our sample (n = 54/260), we considered these cases were worthy of examination.
The first part of the article describes some of the recent literature which touches on issues of fault and blame in post-separation disputes. The next sections look at the background to Australia's no-fault divorce reforms and outline the historical development of the Family Court's jurisprudence on this issue in property matters. The article then goes on to discuss the unreported cases from our sample and the shifts and continuities of practice they reveal. The article concludes by contemplating the future of fault as a decisional factor in property decision making, in light of its apparent reemergence since Kennon, and its adequacy as a basis for addressing the effects of violence in marriage.
II RECENT CRITIQUES OF THE NO-FAULT APPROACH
Among the latest proponents of a fault-based approach to divorce settlements are Eithne Mills and Mirko Bagaric from Deakin Law School. In a 2004 article published in the Australian Journal of Family Law, they drew on equitable principles to propose a principle of 'loyalty' be incorporated into the Family Law Act, and that breaches of this principle be penalised by way of a decreased share of property on divorce where the innocent party has suffered harm as a result of the 'betrayal'. 20 Underpinning this proposal is a claim to moral consensus -that 'the community normally regards a lack of loyalty with considerable distaste'. 21 Mills and Bagaric do not propose a return to The criteria for inclusion in the sample were that an application for adjustment of property interests under s 79 of the Family Law Act had proceeded to a final hearing and resulted in final orders by judicial determination.
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no-fault divorce. In fact, they argue there are 'good reasons' for dissolving a marriage without reference to fault, and that the law should not stand in the way of people 'moving on'. 22 But they suggest, as Patrick Parkinson has done, 23 that there should be financial consequences for marital misbehaviour where it leads to the breakdown of the relationship and causes harm. 24 Not long after this article was published, John Hirst, a history academic from La Trobe University, echoed some of its sentiments, using a Quarterly Essay to launch an attack on the Family Court. 25 Hirst argued that the reforms of the 1970s were premised on an understanding of partners who shared a common desire for their marriage to end, and that a requirement to prove fault in such circumstances was unnecessarily onerous. He proposed that different rules should apply where one partner's conduct is responsible for ending the marriage. This view, he claimed, has widespread community support. 26 Describing marriage as 'a moral act', Hirst suggests that the nofault approach to divorce only increases the 'sense of injury' felt by a spouse who has been betrayed, and that this injury triggers legal battles over children and property. 27 His main concern is for fathers, his primary argument being that men who have been 'faithful husbands' and 'good providers' -who 'did nothing wrong' -feel justifiably outraged when these attributes 'count for absolutely nothing' in legal settlements. 28 Springing from the conservative side of politics, these critiques are unlikely to represent the views of the broader family law community in Australia. Yet their claims to reflect the ways that divorcing couples operate in practice have growing empirical support, and similar sounds of disquiet about the law's refusal to allow separated spouses to vent their grievances about the past have also emanated from scholars with solid feminist credentials. Shelley Day Sclater, for example, sounds not unlike Hirst in her criticism of the legal system's failure to acknowledge the 'psychological realities' of divorce. 29 Based on her study of separating couples, Day Sclater suggests that the divorce transition is an interpretative process in which people 'strive to make sense of what went wrong', and that a degree of 'imputation of blame' and a 'need to revisit the past of the marriage' are necessary for 'true psychological separation'. 30 This research indicates that it is not uncommon for former partners to 'feel mortally wounded by the hurt inflicted by the other', and that expressing anger in these circumstances may well be a 'dignified' response, and can be 'vital if any sense of self is to be preserved'. 31 Other empirical studies in recent years have supported the view that litigation over children and property may often be a proxy for unresolved feelings about the breakdown of the relationship, and that former partners appear to want an official attribution of guilt from the courts. 32 These findings go further than Day Sclater's work, suggesting that the need for vindication and validation -what Carol Smart and Vanessa May call legally 'illegitimate' issues -is part of the reason many separated spouses resort to legal processes, and that the law needs to find some way to acknowledge this reality. 33 Similar messages about the continuing role of fault in postdivorce disputes have come from Australian and English studies of negotiated property settlements, which suggest that feelings of responsibility for instigating the break-up can influence the way couples approach their financial arrangements, 34 and that the person who initiates the separation often relinquishes a portion of the matrimonial property to their former spouse 'as a form of compensation in exchange for peace of mind'. 35 Thus a number of recent critiques emanating from quite different political positions suggest that fault-talk remains a recognisable and perhaps elemental attribute of postdivorce conflict, despite its technical irrelevance to divorce law, and that such talk is likely to find its way into legal disputes and negotiations over the distribution of property.
_____________________________________________________________________________________

III FAULT AND THE FAMILY LAW ACT
A reading of the parliamentary debates that preceded the Family Law Act's passage reveals that the potential for fault discourses to survive their legal prohibition was not much considered at the time the legislation was introduced. The forerunner to the Family Law Act was the Matrimonial Causes Act 1959 (Cth) ('MCA'), the Commonwealth Parliament's first major exercise of its powers over 'divorce and matrimonial causes'. 36 The MCA provided 14 predominantly fault-based grounds for obtaining a divorce, including the traditional matrimonial offences of adultery, desertion and cruelty (including mental cruelty), 37 as well as several no fault-grounds such as insanity 38 and five years separation. 39 Parties who sought to rely on its provisions were called 'petitioners', a term which reinforced the suggestion that a judicial favour was being bestowed on the unhappily married. Petitioners were required to come to court 'with clean hands', and any acts of adultery by the petitioner had to be disclosed to the judge in a sealed discretion statement. 40 commonly relied upon, with proof of the offence often resting on 'hotel evidence' to suggest the respondent had spent the night with a 'third party'. 41 The genesis of a more liberal attitude to divorce can be found in the demographic and attitudinal changes that occurred in the 1960s and 1970s in Australia. The high marriage rates of the post-war period proved unsustainable as traditional gender roles were challenged by the rise of feminism and women's increased workforce participation rates. 42 A more assertive, anti-authoritarian, individualistic and secular approach to social issues contributed to a growing level of resentment towards the costs associated with obtaining a divorce, the lack of privacy, the humiliation of having to prove the existence of matrimonial fault and, as divorce became more common, court delays. 43 By the early 1970s 90 per cent of applications were undefended, 44 and the vast majority invoked grounds such as adultery that would provide an immediate divorce, with partners often colluding to secure their freedom by agreeing to admit to infidelity. 45 Moreover, its fault-based underpinnings had lent divorce law a rather seedy reputation, with divorce cases -particularly between prominent people in the community -regularly featuring in the tabloid press. 46 Together these forces contributed to the government's decision to abolish the MCA framework. 47 The Family Law Bill was first introduced by Attorney-General Lionel Murphy in December 1973. 48 In his second reading speech, the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam described the no-fault provision as a response to public demand. 49 The parliamentary debates preceding its passage were lengthy and passionate, long on rhetoric and short on analysis. Supporters of the Bill questioned the relevance of fault to relationship breakdown and criticised the need for 'sordid procedures' to prove it, describing the search for a 'guilty' party as a 'charade' and suggesting that the reality was typically 'not a matter of some person being at fault' but 'a matter of some sort of incompatibility that has led to the breakdown of the marriage'. 50 divorce, 51 which would overcome the 'embarrassment and distress' of having to 'parade faults in public'. 52 The Family Law Bill finally passed in December 1975 on a free vote, following the fall of the Whitlam government. It came into operation on 5 January 1976, substituting the MCA's grounds for divorce with a single 'no fault' ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage as established by a period of at least 12 months' separation. 53 But little had been mentioned during the debates about the relevance of fault to custody and property matters. The Attorney-General had made a clear statement about its abolition in relation to maintenance applications, 54 but left the position of property settlements ambiguous. Apart from several Senators who raised the potential for fault to be applicable to ancillary proceedings, 55 it seems that few parliamentarians thought it necessary to address the possibility of recriminations about the past re-emerging in this way.
IV FAULT AND PROPERTY ADJUSTMENT: THE CASE LAW
The primary provisions governing the division of property on marriage breakdown are located in Part VIII of the Family Law Act, 56 and give the Family Court a wide discretion to 'make such order as it considers appropriate' altering the parties' interests in their property where 'it is just and equitable' to do so. 57 In exercising this discretion, judges are required to take into account a list of relevant matters, including both past contributions and future needs and resources. As well as Part VIIIB (dealing with superannuation interests), Part VIIIA (dealing with financial agreements), and Part VIIIAA (dealing with third party interests). Whether or not, as one commentator has argued, 61 the Family Law Act was meant to have 'eradicated' allegations of fault from property matters, the reported case law from the Family Court's earliest years suggests that parties continued to raise it. In the 1976 case of Issom, evidence was adduced about the wife's affair and subsequent pregnancy to her Finnish lover, attracting the ire of the trial judge and resulting in denial of her claim for spousal maintenance. The reported judgment describes the wife's behaviour as so 'gross' and wilfully calculated to destroy the marriage relationship that her right to maintenance had been forfeited. 62 But within months of this decision, its reasoning was rejected by the Full Court in the case of Soblusky, 63 a ruling which affected Family Court decision making for the next 20 years. In Soblusky, the Full Court noted the omission from the Family Law Act of any reference to the conduct of the parties, describing this as 'a striking feature which cannot be ignored', and declared that section 75(2)(o) considerations should be restricted to matters of a 'broadly financial nature '. 64 From that time on, as Juliet Behrens noted in her 1993 critique, the reported cases consistently stated that conduct per se was irrelevant, 65 and this held true even when there was compelling evidence of domestic violence during the marriage. For example, in the case of Hack, decided the year after Soblusky was handed down, the wife had been rendered quadriplegic following what Bell J described as 'an incident' involving an attack by her husband. Drawing a clear distinction between the husband's conduct and its financial effects, his Honour held that: evidence relating to the marital conduct of the parties is irrelevant and inadmissible, but that, evidence of conduct affecting broadly financial matters may in some circumstances be admissible and highly relevant. 66 In accordance with this approach, Bell J took into account the wife's needs that had been created by the husband's conduct but not the conduct itself. 67 As this suggests, reported cases in which the behaviour complained of amounted to economic rather than physical misconduct, and where the consequences had an easily understood monetary value, elicited different treatment to those where no evidence of economic impact was shown. 68 As late as 1990, the appropriateness of this distinction continued to be reaffirmed by the Full Court. 69 By the mid-1990s, however, there was a growing body of social science research on the issue of family violence, which detailed its consequences for women and children, 70 including its economic impact. 71 time, academic commentators began to criticise the Court's no-fault discourse, accusing judges of failing women by refusing to consider the effects of violence in property hearings. 72 Behrens argued that both contribution and needs based arguments could be adopted by the court to this end when determining financial orders, by considering the impact of violence on a woman's ability to carry out parenting and homemaking roles and its impact on her present and future financial position, including her capacity for gainful employment. 73 Behrens described as 'unjustified' the 'leap' that had occurred:
from the position that the cause of marriage breakdown should not be examined in determining whether a dissolution should be granted or not … to the idea that we should prevent detailing of conduct in any other related proceedings. 74 In a series of cases commencing in 1994, Family Court judges responded to this challenge and began to distance themselves from the earlier practice of disregarding evidence of violence in both custody and financial matters, 75 including a number of cases involving cross-vested actions for trespass to the person where the Court awarded substantial damages to the claimant. 76 In this new policy climate judgments in property cases started to recognise that violent behaviour may have a detrimental impact on the contributions made to the marriage by a victim spouse. In Doherty, a reported decision from 1995, the trial judge accepted that the wife's homemaker contributions had been affected by her husband's violence. On appeal, the Full Court supported this reasoning and held that the trial judge was: entitled to have found that because of the appellant's conduct, the respondent's contribution as a homemaker was increased and the appellant's similar contribution diminished as a consequence, leading to the overall weighting based upon contribution in favour of the wife being increased. 77 The development of this approach culminated in 1997 in Kennon, in which the Full Court declared that the earlier authorities that purported to preclude evidence of domestic violence were no longer binding. 78 Kennon involved a wife's cross-vested claim for damages for assault and battery, together with her section 79 application. 79 At trial, the wife's treating psychiatrist had provided evidence of the physical and psychological impact of the husband's violence during the marriage, including her 'marked change' in personality. The trial judge accepted the evidence of two individual assaults and awarded damages for these, but found that the husband's conduct had not affected the wife's contributions. The wife did not challenge this finding on appeal, and the Full Court's comments are thus strictly obiter. Nevertheless, Fogarty and Lindenmayer JJ (with Baker J concurring) noted the increasing social science evidence of the 'destructiveness of domestic violence', 80 and held:
where there is a course of violent conduct by one party towards the other during the marriage which is demonstrated to have had a significant adverse impact upon that party's contributions to the marriage, or, put the other way, to have made his or her contributions significantly more arduous than they ought to have been, that is a fact which a trial judge is entitled to take into account in assessing the parties' respective contributions within s 79. 81 The judgment in Kennon makes it clear that this ruling is not confined to the issue of domestic violence and that the relevant criteria are potentially applicable to a 'wider and more general category of conduct'. 82 On the other hand, Fogarty and Lindenmayer JJ expressed concern about allegations of fault becoming 'common coinage' in litigation, as they were in the days prior to the Family Law Act, and suggested its principles should be limited to a 'relatively narrow band of cases'. 83 In the next section we look at the kinds of conduct that have been raised in property hearings over the years and the reach of the Full Court's ruling in Kennon since that decision was handed down.
V FAULT AND JUDICIAL PRACTICES: THE UNREPORTED CASES
In her 1993 article, Behrens speculated that the convention against hearing evidence of fault had been 'so strongly stated in the reported case law' that it was likely to have been 'consistently carried into judicial decision making'. 84 In this part of the article we look at how the case law conventions have played out in day to day decision making, drawing on the cases in our sample of unreported judgments from the Melbourne registry in which an allegation of marital misconduct was discussed. The sub-sample of judgments here comprises those in which the relevance of alleged conduct to the adjustment of property interests was addressed (n = 43), as well as those where an appraisal of a spouse's behaviour formed part of the discursive background of the judgment but was not explicitly factored into the outcome (n = 14). 85 Three of these judgments contained discussion of the relevance of one party's conduct, or one form of conduct, to the adjustment of property as well as a critique of the other party's conduct, or another form of conduct, and are thus relevant to both categories. Behrens, above n 16, 11.
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Cases were excluded where the conduct related to the running of the case (such as a failure to disclose assets to the court).
relevance of alleged conduct to the adjustment exercise), 30 were decided prior to the decision in Kennon and 13 were heard after Kennon was handed down. 86 There is, of course, no way of knowing how many of the disputes in our sample actually involved issues of marital misbehaviour. There were a number of additional cases in our sample which contained indications that a party had raised a matter of conduct -a suggestion of violence for example -that was not mentioned further in the judgment. 87 Given the effective prohibition on adducing evidence of spousal abuse prior to Kennon, and the now well-known pressures on women who have experienced violence which militate against them using the legal system to obtain a property settlement, 88 it is not surprising that this issue appears to have been raised (as far as we can tell) relatively rarely in our sample, especially in the early years. 89 As our sample was not selected to include allegations of fault, we do not know whether the cases discussed here are over-or under-representative of its incidence in property hearings. Our aim in this article, however, is to be descriptive rather than quantitative, to illustrate and reflect on the ways in which the judges in our sample approached evidence of marital misconduct when it was put before the court and the extent to which their apparent (un)willingness to consider fault complied with or went beyond the case law guidelines of the time.
The kinds of conduct described in these cases include domestic violence, child sexual abuse and abusive parenting by fathers, alcohol and drug abuse, gambling, neglect or abandonment of the home and family by the wife, wasting or dissipation of assets, fraud, and extra-marital affairs. While the approach to some of these behaviours -such as dissipation of assets and fraud -changed little over the years, the cases reveal that other forms of conduct -such as domestic violence, men's parenting of children, and infidelity -have attracted quite different judicial responses at different times in the Court's history, in ways which suggest that Kennon was both an expression of shifts in social attitudes to marriage and family life and a trigger for changes in judicial treatment of spousal and parental behaviour. For the most part, judges approached the issue of conduct as one affecting past contributions, not future needs. The extent of adjustment they made for fault, however, was not always clear on the face of the judgments, and our analysis is therefore necessarily more concerned with the features of the evidence which appear to have rendered conduct relevant than with its impact on the outcome. 90 
_____________________________________________________________________________________
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A
The pre-Kennon cases As Behrens predicted, the early cases in our sample largely conformed to the dictates of the prevailing case law. Where allegations of domestic violence were raised prior to Kennon, these were generally dismissed as being irrelevant to the adjustment exercise. A good illustration is the very first case in our sample, Case 1.1 (1976), where the judge divided the couple's assets equally between them after finding the wife's greater earnings were balanced by the husband's ownership of an unencumbered home at the commencement of the relationship. 91 In the course of the judgment, his Honour noted that two issues of conduct had been raised by the parties. The first concerned the husband's allegation that the wife's spending habits during the marriage had been 'extravagant'; the second related to allegations of violence. After considering the evidence, the judge found the former complaint was not made out, and that the wife had spent most of her earnings on the family. Evidence adduced in support of the latter claim, however, met with the following judicial response:
The relationship between the parties seems to have deteriorated gravely from about 1972 onwards and there were some unfortunate and violent disputes between them. There is no necessity to allocate praise or blame. It has no relevance to the question of ancillary relief in this case.
Other judgments from this era involving a claim of violent conduct exhibited a similar lack of enthusiasm for investigating its effects and a suggestion that the behaviour was likely mutual. In Case 2.18, decided in 1981, the wife led evidence that she was suffering from a back injury which had been exacerbated by the husband's assaults on her, and raised this as an issue calling for a needs-based adjustment in her favour. The wife had been a widow with two young children at the time of the marriage. The judge found that, despite the impact of this injury on her earning capacity, she had reaped financial benefits from the marriage and 'was rather better off than she would have been if she had continued to live in her own house and had to live on social services'. As to the allegations of violence, his Honour concluded:
I think it is likely that there were some physical altercations between the husband and wife. It is common ground that on one occasion in January 1977 the wife struck the husband on the head with a brass ornament. I think it is likely that he resorted to violence at times. However, I believe that objectively those assaults were not as severe as the wife paints them. I am certainly not satisfied he deliberately tried to cause her back injury as the wife would suggest. Case 1.39 from 1980 is also instructive. In this case the trial judge was critical of the wife's neglect of the family, but unwilling to investigate the allegations of abuse which may have explained it. The judge accepted that the marriage had been characterised by violence, but also that the wife had left the home from time to time, placing a 'heavy burden' of responsibility on the husband for the couple's seven children. The wife's absences from the home, which were described as 'flighty and irresponsible', were considered to have reduced the value of her homemaker contributions. In contrast with this treatment, the judgment displays a distinct disinterest in investigating the issue of violence, which was dismissed with the following speculation about its cause:
It is quite apparent that there was violence between them, whether that violence was precipitated by drinking by either or both parties or by extra-marital conduct by either or both of the parties, I am unable to say.
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 91
This case predated the development of the 'erosion' principle.
There were, however, two early cases in our sample in which evidence of violence did have an impact on the division of property. In each of these, the judge accepted the evidence of abuse -including the husband's constant 'denigration' and 'vicious assault' on the wife in the first case, 92 and 'threats on the lives of the wife and the children' in the second 93 -and concluded that the wife's neglect of 'her mothering and household duties' (in the first case) and abandonment of the home (in the second) was justified on this basis. The consequence of these findings, however, was not to increase the value of the woman's homemaker contributions but to prevent them from being diminished, as had happened to the wife in Case 1.39. The following comments from the judgment in the second of these cases illustrate this point:
It seems to me that there was a great deal of abuse on the part of the husband towards her. She alleges some violence in her affidavits. There were threats made after they separated; threats on the lives of the wife and the children according to her affidavit material. I mention these things because insofar as reliance is placed on the fact that the wife left the home, I do nothing in the circumstances of this case that can result in a deduction of what should be justly due to her in this case.
A number of the early 'fault' judgments in our sample dealt with issues of 'excessive drinking' or gambling. Unlike the domestic violence cases, evidence of this kind of behaviour was not peremptorily dismissed, but, in accordance with principle, prompted consideration of its relevance to the parties' property entitlements. In some cases, a significant economic impact was found, affecting adjustment of the property. In Case 2.27 (1983), the wife was awarded the entire equity in the matrimonial home after the judge found that her husband's 'considerable' drinking had been 'a drain on the family resources which was of a serious nature', while the husband in Case 3.22 (1989) received 75 per cent of the couple's assets after a 21 year marriage because his wife's gambling habit had severely diminished the family's income. At other times, no adjustment was made because there had been little or no impact on the family finances. 94 Not all the cases we included in our survey of fault involved an assessment of its relevance to the property division. We also found cases in which the judgment included criticism of a spouse's behaviour which suggested this may nevertheless have been influential in shaping the outcome of the case. This occurred particularly (although not exclusively) in the first years of the Court's history, suggesting perhaps that while fault was no longer legally relevant, its capacity to excite decision makers, and the inclination to judge the conduct of married partners, took longer to fade away. In a 1978 case, 95 the court heard evidence of the wife's gambling habit. Although the judge in this case 'excused' the wife's behaviour because of the difficulties she had faced in 'adjusting to a strange environment' (the wife was a Malaysian national), he proceeded to condemn her lack of 'dedication to the marriage' and admonish the husband for his 'ill-advised' decision to marry a 'vivacious type of woman' who was 22 years his junior. This kind of 'judgement passing' was noticeable in a number of the early cases, where, for example, wives were criticised for being 'pre-occupied' with For example, in Case 1. 33 (1979) , the judge concluded that the wife's 'drinking habits' had not 'played a major role in inhibiting the growth of the family finances'. paid work, 96 and for providing their husband with 'little society in the home', 97 or for establishing a 'friendship with another man'. 98 As the last-mentioned critique suggests, the issue of infidelity was not entirely absent from the early cases, and several of the judgments contained criticism of one party for abandoning the marriage for a new partner and, on occasion, a suggestion that the judge may have factored this into the assessment of contributions. In Case 2.44, the wife had left the family home (and the family farm) to live with another man. Despite the fact that the husband had not raised this as a matter affecting her contributions, the judgment includes the following statement:
It would be open for the husband to argue that, during the later months of the marriage when the wife was pursuing an affair with Mr S, she became unavailable to assist him with the property and the greater burden fell on him. He has not alleged that, but it would not achieve justice and equity between the parties were I to place the husband's financial contribution on a lower plane than the wife's contribution as a homemaker and mother and towards the farm which the parties conducted.
As the preceding discussion indicates, there were a number of cases in the preKennon cohort which revealed interesting resistances by judges to the Soblusky approach. Indeed, several pre-Kennon judgments suggest that the decision maker had considered a party's conduct to be sufficiently reprehensible, and the impact on the other partner sufficiently grievous, that it warranted an adjustment of assets regardless of the absence of economic impact. One of these, Case 3.9 from 1986, involved a 17 year marriage and parties who had run a small business together. At some point during the marriage the husband acquired a 'mistress', with whom he set up another business -a massage parlour -and during the final five years of the marriage this woman lived with him and the wife in the matrimonial home. In assessing the wife's contributions, the judge had regard to the fact that she had been 'the unwilling hostess to her husband's mistress', and concluded that her homemaker contributions should be 'given more weight than normal here, by reason of the unusual circumstances under which the wife was forced to live'.
Another of these cases, Case 4.44, was decided in 1995, the same year that the Full Court handed down its judgment in Doherty, and is thus perhaps less a resistance to the Soblusky doctrine than a reflection of the transition that was taking place in the Court which culminated in Kennon. This case involved extreme, long term violence by the husband against his wife, culminating in his being jailed for hiring a hit-man to kill her. The case also involved fraud, the husband having transferred the matrimonial home to his brother without the wife's knowledge. In this case, the judge found that the husband had made a 'negative contribution' -an argument suggested by Behrens 99 -and that the wife's contributions were more than usually 'significant':
On all the evidence the wife has also been the overwhelming contributor to the welfare of the family. That contribution has been even more significant since June, 1993 because she has had to live with the terrible knowledge that the husband wished her dead and took very active steps to achieve that. It is an enormous burden for her to carry and the fact that she has managed to continue in those circumstances is a matter of great credit to her. _____________________________________________________________________________________ The parties' contributions were assessed as being 65/35 in the wife's favour and she was given an additional adjustment of 15 per cent under s 75(2) to allow her to relocate away from the husband, of whom she was found to be understandably afraid.
B
The post-Kennon decisions The ruling in Kennon was welcomed by many, while others saw it as a 'risky' decision that harboured the potential to reintroduce the pre-Family Law Act approach to property settlements. 100 In the first years after it was handed down, Sarah Middleton conducted a small study of unreported cases in which its principles had been invoked in relation to allegations of domestic violence. 101 Her analysis showed that the Family Court was 'having little apparent difficulty' in accommodating the Kennon considerations when violence was raised. 102 The relevant cases from our sample exhibited a similar profile on this issue.
(i)
Domestic violence There were six cases involving domestic violence among our post-Kennon judgments in which its principles were raised by wives and applied by the court. 103 In five of these, the woman's contributions received a modest increase in recognition of the effects of the husband's conduct, and in one of these five, a further adjustment was made under section 75(2). 104 In the sixth case, Case 5.46 (2001), the wife led evidence of multiple sexual assaults upon her by the husband, but the judge found that these had occurred in the months leading up to separation and thus fell outside the Kennon ruling:
Part of the wife's case was that the husband was violent to her and belittled and demeaned her and that this made the contributions which she made more difficult in the circumstances and thus should result in a further adjustment in her favour… In my view, Kennon does not assist the wife in this case. The Full Court said the considerations would apply only in a relatively narrow band of cases and that it was necessary to show that the conduct occurred during the course of the marriage and had a discernible impact on the contributions of the other party. It is not directed to conduct which does not have that effect nor to conduct in relation to the breakdown of the marriage. The allegations of the wife, which were denied by the husband, clearly fall within that embargo.
Where adjustments were made for domestic violence, as occurred in the other five cases in this group, the abuse had been a long term feature of the relationship and the impact on the wife considerable. The judge in Case 5.30, for example, found the husband 'throughout the marriage, has been a controlling and abusive man'. His Honour made detailed findings that the husband had physically assaulted his wife, used intimidation, threats and other emotional abuse against her and the children, and had 'exerted control over the members of the household in financial matters'. His Middleton examined 35 unreported first instance judgments drawn from 10 separate registries that were decided by 22 different judicial officers. Some of the cases had been decided before Kennon but had made claims for an increased contribution on the basis of the Full Court's decision in Doherty. 102 Ibid 230. 103 Out of a total of 40 judgments decided after Kennon. 104 Case 5.27 (1999).
Honour also accepted evidence that this conduct had left the wife with significant health problems -including vertigo, tinnitus, headaches, depression, insomnia, mood variations, lethargy, loss of concentration, anxiety, and loss of self esteem -and concluded that both the wife's financial and homemaker contributions should be given additional weight 'because of the difficult circumstances under which she laboured to perform them'. 105 Similarly, the judge in Case 5.60 described the husband's 'high level of emotional and verbal abuse' of the wife as having 'persisted' throughout the couple's 19 year marriage, rendering the wife's financial and homemaker contributions 'all the more difficult' and justifying an adjustment of 10 per cent in her favour 'by virtue of the pressures which he put on her'. The judge in this case noted that the wife's claim of violence was well supported, not only by the evidence but by his assessment of the parties in the witness box:
My observations of both parties lead me to the inescapable conclusion that those allegations [of abuse] are correct. In the first place, I observed [the wife] to be highly traumatised. Nothing in her affect created the slightest concern in me that there was anything artificial or made up with respect to either the allegations or the effect. Secondly, [the husband's] attitudes, emotional makeup and readily conceded actions since the parties' separation are all entirely consistent with the allegations made by [the wife]. I accordingly find that that behaviour by [the husband] persisted throughout the parties' cohabitation. I make that finding on the highest degree of probability and indicate that I would have no hesitation in finding beyond reasonable doubt if it were necessary for me to do so.
Case 5.22 provides a further example of the kind of evidence which attracted an adjustment for domestic violence in our sample cases. Here the judge accepted the wife's claim that she had 'suffered physical abuse from the husband commencing from about four to five years after the marriage', and that she been 'subjected to repeated verbal abuse and belittlement' since that time. The marriage had lasted 25 years. The wife's evidence, which was supported by the parties' eldest son, included accounts of physical assaults requiring medical treatment, of being 'dragged around the house by her hair' and having a knife held to her throat, of attacks on the son who had tried to protect her, and the husband's eventual conviction for assault. The judge concluded that this was 'an obvious example of a case where the effects of family violence should be considered on the issue of contribution', and the husband's counsel appears to have conceded the point, albeit arguing that the adjustment should be 'slight'. In the end, the wife was awarded an additional 10 per cent of the assets because the husband's conduct had made her contributions 'significantly more arduous than they ought to have been'.
Apart from Case 5.46, these judgments dealt squarely with the issues that had been raised in Kennon itself -a 'course of violent conduct' by the husband which had a 'discernible impact' on the wife's contributions -and saw the wife receive a modest adjustment of property on this account. However, as the judge in one of our early post-1997 cases noted, the Full Court's ruling had provided decision makers with _____________________________________________________________________________________ 105 The judgment in this case does not disclose the amount of the adjustment made for this factor.
considerable scope for a broad interpretation of its applicability. 106 Middleton's study found the application of the Kennon criteria had quickly extended to conduct other than domestic violence. 107 Our sample, too, revealed an extended practice. In addition to the well-established categories of substance abuse and dissipation of assets, judges were asked to examine behaviour of a more interpersonal nature, including conduct affecting the children and allegations of 'discernible impact' caused by infidelity.
(ii) Other conduct Evidence of substance abuse continued to trigger a judicial response in property hearings, but because of Kennon, its relevance was not confined to the impact on the family finances. In Case 5.18 (1998), a husband's addiction to heroin during the marriage attracted an adjustment in the wife's favour, not only because the family would have been in 'a significantly improved financial position' if not for his habit, but also because of its 'vast effect' on the wife's contributions. The later cases in our sample also revealed some novel fault issues. In Case 5.13, the assessment of contributions centred on the husband's sexual abuse of the wife's daughter, conduct which brought about the end of the marriage and led to the husband being imprisoned following his conviction for rape. The trial judge found that the wife's 'discovery' of the husband's abuse, and 'the consequences which flowed from it', had been 'devastating' for her, and that this was 'the very sort of factor' envisaged by the Kennon ruling:
[The] factor which is of a compelling nature in this case is the additional contributions which the wife made to the family arising out of the discovery of the sexual abuse by the husband of [the child] … and the consequences which flowed from it. It seems clear that that is the very sort of factor which was contemplated by the Full Court in Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757. This was a devastating circumstance, striking at the very essence of the marriage and imposing upon the wife enormous additional responsibilities, both emotional and financial.
In another 1999 case, the Kennon principle resulted in the wife obtaining an increased share of the property because of the husband's 'dysfunctional' parenting. 108 Although there was also conduct in this case that could fall within the definition of spousal abuse, the judge ultimately rejected this characterisation and focused on the husband's behaviour as a parent. The wife led evidence that the husband had been abusive towards her over a long period, but the extent of his physical abuse was conceded to be 'minor' and the judge concluded it had not affected her contributions. However, his Honour did accept evidence that the husband had been an emotionally abusive parent, including neglecting his daughters and spending 'a great deal of his time in seclusion with his computer':
As time went by I am satisfied that he withdrew from the role of providing parental guidance and control and adopted a critical and non-constructive role which was resented by the children.
The judge found that as a result of the husband's behaviour, the couple's two children were suffering from severe psychological health problems -including selfharming behaviour -and this finding attracted a Kennon adjustment. Contributions _____________________________________________________________________________________ 106 The judge in Case 5.22 expressed a personal preference for a broad interpretation of the Full Court's ruling, commenting that he 'would be concerned if too much weight was to be placed upon the "floodgates principle"'. 107 Middleton, above n 101, 237. 108 Case 5.25 (1999).
were assessed as being 65/35 in the wife's favour because the husband's parenting behaviour had placed 'an increased load' upon her in this respect and rendered her 'task of looking after the family considerably more difficult than if he had not been there at all'. A further adjustment of 10 per cent under section 75(2) recognised her ongoing responsibility for the girls' high care needs:
I also attach weight to the wife's future responsibilities for the financial and moral support which she will be obliged to give to [the children] and the lack of the same from the husband. I do this because of the special circumstances of this case wherein both of these daughters have suffered from the dysfunctional family life which they have had to endure principally through the husband's conduct towards them and the results of which the wife is now left to cope with.
Another illustration of the potential reach of the Kennon ruling is provided by two recent cases involving claims of infidelity. The husband and wife in Case 5.41, decided in 2001, had spent several periods of their marriage apart while the husband was away on business. During this time the wife had an affair with another man. The husband argued that this conduct amounted to a negative contribution by her, and that it had affected his own contributions and commitment to the marriage. After considering the evidence, including that the parties had reconciled and had a child after the affair became known, the judge ruled that the husband's claimed impact was not made out. Unlike the judgments discussed above where the evidence revealed significant emotional damage to a spouse or child, the judgment here suggests that the husband's argument had been a cynical attempt to offset his own negative contributions in dissipating assets at the time of separation. Although this case did not raise Kennon directly, 109 the husband's overt reliance on his wife's affair here seems to reflect a revived assumption about the relevance of fault to property division, in which Kennon is clearly implicated. Indeed, the second 'infidelity' case in our sample illustrates the potential for Kennon to be used to address (or exploit) such behaviour.
The parties in Case 5.58 had been married 20 years, during which time five children were born. The couple separated when the husband became aware that he was not the biological father of the three youngest children -their biological father being a man with whom the wife had had a longstanding affair. By contrast with Case 5.41 above, the judge was highly critical of the wife's behaviour here, and greatly concerned by the effect it had had on the husband. Like the cases involving the sexual abuse of the wife's daughter and the husband's emotional abuse of his children, the judgment constructs him as the innocent victim of intentional abuse. He was a man whose 'whole focus was the family unit he perceived as his', who was now 'grappling with the emotional consequences' of his wife's conduct. The judge found that the wife's behaviour had implications for the assessment of contributions, both because she had depleted the family income by maintaining an apartment with her lover and because of its 'profound' effect on the husband's contributions, and that this warranted an adjustment of 15 per cent in his favour. The wife's counsel argued that this conduct fell outside the kind envisaged by the Full Court in Kennon, but the judge in this case disagreed:
I do not accept that to be the law, the Full Court making it clear in Kennon (1997) FLC 92-757 that conduct could be relevant within s 79. In that case the Court was considering the _____________________________________________________________________________________ 109 Fogarty and Lindenmayer JJ noted in Kennon that they did not favour a negative contributions approach: (1997) 22 Fam LR 1, 24.
issue of domestic violence, although it made it clear that it was one example of a category of conduct which might be relevant to s 79 findings.
Noting that the Full Court had been well 'aware of the dangers of inappropriate use of allegations of misconduct in property cases' when handing down its judgment in Kennon, the judge concluded that the present scenario more than met its criteria:
It is difficult to imagine a situation which impacted more upon the contributions of a party than that in which [the husband] found himself. I am satisfied that [the wife] introduced into the household three children whom she knew were not children of her husband, with the intention that she and he would bear equally their financial, physical and emotional support. Finding herself pregnant with [the first of the three younger children] one might be able to argue that she acquiesced in a potentially destructive deception without any real consideration of the consequences. However, she then intentionally bore two more children and, following a pre-arranged plan, introduced them into the [parties'] household as children for whom [the husband] was financially and personally responsible.
The wife's behaviour loomed large in the property division process in this case. The conduct in question involved a mixture of financial impact and emotional fallout. By 'keeping house' with her lover the wife had deprived the family of income and this was taken into account, just as it presumably would have been under Soblusky. But the debilitating effect of her behaviour on the husband's sense of family, and the impact of this on his contributions, were also taken into account, a practice that was not sanctioned prior to Kennon.
VI CONCLUSION: A RETURN TO FAULT?
While the passage of the Family Law Act in 1975 ushered in an era of no-fault divorce, it also created a requirement to assess non-financial contributions, such as homemaker and parenting contributions, when determining property interests. Despite this recognition of the value of care work in families (typically performed by women), the potential for these contributions to be affected by a spouse's abuse was not acknowledged until the 1990s. Not until Kennon in 1997 were judges officially permitted to have regard to evidence of violence when assessing contributions where no financial impact was identified. The ruling in Kennon was the product of the Court's (and the community's) growing awareness of the effects of violence against women in intimate relationships. At the same time, other important social changes were taking place, including increasing expectations of men as parents, 110 and mounting consumer demand for the legal system to be more responsive to the emotional impact of divorce, and Kennon also provided scope for these shifts to play out in property cases. The evolutionary picture of the Court's approach to family violence in our unreported judgments largely reflects the concerns and findings of other family law researchers. 111 As Behrens surmised it would, the case law discouragement of claims about spousal abuse was also evident in our sample, with decision makers dismissing allegations of violence (and suggesting the conduct was likely to have been mutual) and failing to comprehend its effects (for example, as an explanation for a woman's _____________________________________________________________________________________ 110 For example, the introduction of the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth), which replaced the custody and access division of parental responsibilities with a shared parenting framework. 111 See Behrens, above n 16, and Middleton, above n 101.
flight from the home). Women who experienced significant violence prior to Kennon could thus be doubly disadvantaged. Not only was no additional weight given to contributions performed under 'arduous' circumstances, but a victim might also find her contributions devalued for reduced attention to the home and family. On the other hand, we also found pre-Kennon cases where decision makers had been sensitive to these issues, and had accepted and used evidence of the husband's violence to prevent diminution of the wife's contributions on this account.
Not surprisingly there were no early cases where infidelity was explicitly argued, but there were some where the decision maker had been critical of a wife's 'affair' or 'friendship' with another man, and intimations that this might have affected the outcome. By contrast, Cases 5.41 and 5.58 suggest that modern litigants feel less inhibited about making claims for property adjustment based on a spouse's betrayal, and that judges have been prepared to entertain these. There has also been an interesting journey regarding contributions to parenting and the welfare of the family, judging by our sample of judgments. The cases that attracted criticism for poor parenting in the pre-Kennon cohort were concerned with mothers who neglected their children and left a 'heavy burden' of care on their husband, and wives who lacked 'dedication to the marriage' or provided 'little society in the home'. By comparison, our post-Kennon example involved a father who had withdrawn from 'providing parental guidance' to his children, and whose 'critical and non-constructive' parenting behaviour justified an increased property award to his wife.
The shift of judicial narrative from disinterest in allocating 'praise or blame' in Case 1.1 to passionate concern for the husband's wellbeing and rebuke of the wife's 'destructive deception' in Case 5.58, suggests a revival of fault-based decision making in marital property cases, one that seems to have travelled well beyond the kind of conduct envisaged in Kennon. On closer examination, however, the judgments in our sample reveal both continuity and change, and perhaps more of the former than the latter. A common thread running through the post-Kennon cases where adjustments were made for conduct -whether the conduct was characterised as domestic violence, dysfunctional parenting, or infidelity -is evidence of abusive behaviour on the one hand, and emotional or psychological damage (to a partner or child) on the other. Moreover, the willingness of the decision maker in Case 3.9 to compensate the wife for being 'the unwilling hostess to her husband's mistress' -despite there being no evidence of financial impact -suggests that these 'abuse and harm' factors may have triggered a similar judicial response well before the Full Court authorised it. 112 Some judges, it seems, have always been prepared to provide official vindication for hurt and humiliation if the evidence is sufficiently compelling.
Since Kennon, adjustments of homemaker (and sometimes financial) contributions where a pattern of violence by one partner during the marriage has rendered the performance of these contributions 'significantly more arduous than they ought to have been' have become normative. The adjustments for violence in our sample, as Middleton found in her survey, were modest and arbitrary (around 10 per cent) and, with one exception, not supplemented for recognition of the victim's needs via section _____________________________________________________________________________________ 112 Case 3.9 was decided 11 years before Kennon.
75(2), even when there was evidence of serious health problems. 113 An added problem for victims of violence is the 'course of conduct' requirement, which rules out evidence of assaults in the period leading up to separation (as in Case 5.46). Interestingly, the same restriction appears to have been side-stepped in cases where a spouse's 'discovery' of their partner's abuse (of the stepdaughter in Case 5.13) or deception (in Case 5.58), which was the basis of the harm, triggered the separation. But the larger issue here, of course, is the problem of how to assign a value to non-financial contributions in the first place, whether or not they are performed in arduous circumstances. 114 The cases in our sample lend support to Behrens' arguments for a dedicated legal response to violence against women, 115 and Middleton's suggestion that this be the subject of explicit direction in the Family Law Act, preferably as a needsbased factor. 116 We are conscious of the need to be careful about drawing conclusions from such a small group of cases, which may reflect little more than differences in values between individual judges. 117 With that rider, however, it seems arguable from the decisional approaches reflected in these judgments that Kennon, rather than triggering a shift in judicial practices, may have simply provided authoritative support for an always present willingness by some judges to rebuke reprobate spouses and that, as Berns and others have suggested, property litigation is not immune from the airing of claims about spousal conduct. As one divorce lawyer noted rather presciently in 1975:
No doubt Courts under the Family Law Act will still, from time to time, be urged to find that one party has acted correctly throughout [the marriage] while the actions of the other have been characterised by great irresponsibility. 118 In the end, then, these cases do not signal a comeback for fault in property decision making, or that it ought to be reinstated. Rather they support the argument that blaming never really went away.
